

September 14, 2020

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Secretary of the Commission 888 First Street NE Washington, DC 20426

FERC Docket: AD20-21-000

Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower Projects: Chapter 16— Part 12D Program

Submitted via eFiling

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Commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,

The National Hydropower Association (NHA) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) Chapter 16 – Part 12D Program of its Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Hydropower Projects draft for public comment. The association commends the Commission for its dedication to dam and public safety. These comments, which are organized by section within the guideline, provide suggested changes, request additional clarity and outline concerns from the industry. NHA requests that FERC take into consideration each comment before moving forward with finalizing the guideline.

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I. Introduction and General NHA Comments

The National Hydropower Association (NHA) is a national non-profit trade association dedicated exclusively to advancing the interests of the U.S. hydropower industry, including conventional, pumped storage, and new marine and hydrokinetic technologies. NHA's membership consists of over 240 organizations, including consumer-owned utilities, investor-owned utilities, independent power producers, equipment manufacturers, environmental and engineering firms, and attorneys.

NHA commends FERC for exploring ways the D2SI program can be changed to further enhance the safety and stability of the nation's non-federal hydropower dams. NHA recognizes the challenge FERC has been tasked with as well as the complexity involved in creating a process that better identifies ongoing issues across an industry of highly individualized projects. The Hydropower industry recognizes that certain infrastructure within the hydro fleet is aging and may warrant additional investment. NHA believes FERC's goal of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) and the guidelines are to help industry to identify where appropriate investments are needed. These comments include suggestions for improvement to Chapter 16 – Part 12D Program to ensure that safety, risk and financial burden are considered when making changes to the D2SI program.

II. NHA Comments to Guideline Sections

a. Preface

The first paragraph of the preface within Chapter 16 references Chapter 14, NHA inquires as to whether chapter 14 will be updated or made available for comment.

b. 16-2.1.3 - Waivers

NHA believes the language within section 16-2.1.3 may lead to confusion between the new Comprehensive Assessment (CA) Waiver process and a Part 12D Exemption. The section states "Depending on the facts and conditions associated with a project – including the hazard potential, risk, and the reason it is subject to the Part 12D Program – the Regional Engineer may grant a waiver from the requirement that a CA be performed once every ten years." The paragraph later states "The FERC understands that some remote projects have extremely low consequences and CA's on a ten-year cycle may not be necessary..." To provide clarity, NHA recommends the paragraph be revised as follows:

Depending on the facts and conditions associated with a project – including the hazard potential, risk, and the reason it is subject to the Part 12D Program – tThe Regional Engineer may grant a waiver from the requirement that a CA be performed once every ten years. This will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the Regional Engineer, in consultation with the Director, D2SI. Any requests by a licensee to obtain a blanket waiver from performing a Comprehensive Assessment, without having performed one previously to provide a full understanding of the project, will not be considered. The FERC understands that some remote projects have extremely low consequences and CAs on a ten-year cycle may not be necessary; however, the FERC does not intend to provide such a waiver without the full understanding provided by the initial CA. NHA requests clarity as to whether a low hazard project, including a project that does not currently fall under Part 12D, is subject to Part 12D and the corresponding CA. In regard to the CA requirement and the blanket waiver process, NHA believes there is considerable effort required of licensees who own certain projects with existing exemptions where waivers are warranted. FERC currently regulates over 2500 dams, Chapter 16 requires every dam to complete a CA before it can obtain a waiver, including in cases where the licensee has already obtained a waiver. NHA requests that FERC carefully prioritize required CAs across its portfolio to control the review backlog and ensure that licensees receive timely reviews of submitted Comprehensive Assessment Reports (CAR).

Additionally, NHA suggests FERC allow licensees and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to take part in commercial agreements, related to a CA specifically, in cases where a licensee owns a hydroelectric project on a USACE dam, but does not have the responsibility of the dam and spillway. Within this scenario, a licensee would receive a waiver for the CA with those responsibilities integrated within the CA conducted by the USACE.

c. 16-2.3 - IC Team's Pre-Inspection Preparation Report

With regard to the Pre-Inspection Preparation Report (PIPR) the IC is required to document their initial findings from the review of project documentation. NHA is concerned this report will increase the cost of the review. NHA also expresses concern over the increased costs associated with the CA review meeting requirement, where the Independent Consultant Team provides findings and recommendations within the CAR.

d. 16-2.4.1 - Periodic Inspections

NHA requests additional clarity on the purpose of the Independent Consultant's (IC) review of the relevant background material. NHA inquires as to whether the intent to simply become familiar with the project or if a technical review of all available reports is to take place.

e. 16-2.4.2 - Comprehensive Assessment

NHA requests further guidance on attendees required to be present at the CA review meeting, specifically with regard to FERC and the licensee.

f. 16-2.5.1 - Licensees

While NHA agrees the IC Team must have sufficient freedom to complete an independent review and assessment, NHA recommends striking the below sentence as the notion is discussed in the prior sentence and the below may stifle communication between the licensee and IC team.

"Licensees are not to influence the conclusions or recommendations of the IC(s) or IC Team, and the IC(s) must document any request by the licensee to modify any conclusions or recommendations prior to finalization of the Part 12D Report."

Some Licensees employee professional engineers seasoned in dam safety that would provide significant professional value to the PA and CA process by working closely with independent consultants. Providing documentation of significant conversations that influence conclusions and recommendations between the licensee and IC seems reasonable, however to potentially restrict a collaborative discussion from occurring may have adverse consequences. The PA and CA provide a level of engineering judgment, depending on the findings there may be multiple ways to reach the same result. Communication between the licensee's staff and IC will most likely facilitate the best result.

g. 16-2.5.4 - FERC Dam Safety Personnel - Table 2

With regard to section 16-2.5.4 FERC Dam Safety Personnel, Table 2 states that a licensee is to submit the Part 12D inspection plan to FERC 6 months in advance of the first IC Team activity, however section 16-3.3.4 strongly recommends one year. NHA requests that timelines be consistent across the proposed rule and supporting guidelines to allow for timely submittal of the plan.

h. 16-3.2 - Independent Consultant Requirements

With regard to the IC requirements, NHA recommends FERC remove the requirement that an IC be licensed within the state in which the project is located. Licensure within the state is an important consideration when taking on an inspection project, but the responsibility belongs to the IC, the IC's employer, and the licensee, with reference to the requirements of the specific state licensing board(s). If FERC is unable to reconsider this requirement, NHA requests clarity as to whether this is a requirement or suggestion with regard to supporting IC Team members and whether FERC would entertain exemptions for geologists or other specialties.

NHA agrees it is vital that an IC have the necessary experience in order to properly review a project and under certain circumstances, a team of individuals is necessary to complete the review process. However, NHA has several concerns related to the guidance.

NHA requests FERC provide greater clarity as to whether the ten-year experience requirement applies to one member of the IC team or extends to other members of the IC Team. The current IC experience standard is ten years, it is unclear whether the intent is to simply codify the current standard applying it to one lead IC or all lead IC's, in cases where there are more than one. NHA encourages FERC limit the requirement to just one of the lead IC's in cases where there are two or more, and not to extend the provision to the remaining IC Team members. Under this condition a licensee is provided the opportunity to designate the IC and team members based on requisite experience, and over time will enable team members to gain experience and eventually expand the pool of qualified ICs.

Additionally, NHA requests clarity as to the number of professional engineers that are required within the IC team, and whether one professional engineer acting as the lead will meet FERC's requirements.

With regard to the restriction on an IC having done past work for a licensee, NHA suggests FERC consider the negative impacts this provision may have on the supply of qualified ICs available for Part 12 CAs and respectfully requests that it be removed.

Currently, the pool of available consultants is very limited. Taking into consideration the requirements of this restriction, additional consultants will be required per assessment with additional time required within the assessment; in the field, conducting a Potential Failure Mode Analysis (PFMA), conducting a Risk Assessment (RA), as well as in the preparation of the reports. The proposed guideline could place

even greater burden on smaller licensees whose resources may be more limited than larger licensees in securing and scheduling timely Part 12 assessments.

The proposed guideline may also limit the number of consultants and firms available to perform critical engineering design work. To not preclude themselves from future Part 12 work, some consultants and firms may elect to restrict themselves and no longer take on design work for licensees. The same could be true in cases where consultants and firms elect to restrict themselves to no longer take on Part 12 work, so as to not preclude themselves from taking on design work.

Additionally, licensees can argue, contrary to the suggestion, that an IC's past experience related to a project could, in fact, make the individual more qualified to complete a Part 12 review.

Licensed professional engineers already must adhere to professional practice requirements which are codified in nearly all licensing jurisdictions that address conflict-of-interest issues. NHA suggests FERC consider other alternatives that might meet the ultimate goals of this restriction, and offers the following alternatives for FERC's consideration; 1.) possible exclusion of the requirement in cases where an IC engaged in minor previous work; 2.) possible exclusion based on composition of the previous review team, a lead would not be considered, however an IC that practiced in a minor role would be considered; 3.) levels of separation with regard to timing between reviews, perhaps a full review cycle of the CA and PI between an IC reviewing a project.

Section 16-3.2 references the intent of 18 CFR 12.31(a)(5) is to prevent a member of the IC Team from reviewing their own work, or the work of others employed by the same firm. The proposed requirement will limit licensees' ability to hire consultants to complete PI and CA work. NHA believes a licensee and IC could easily find themselves in a predicament where the IC performed work on a project, leaves their firm to join a competing firm, which is also the firm the licensee has hired to perform a CA on the same project. In this scenario, the licensee would be required to terminate the contract with the firm. NHA fears that this, or a similar situation, will be a prevalent dilemma particularly with the already restricted pool of ICs.

16-3.2 also states, "An engineer or engineers from the same firm, will not be approved as an IC for more than two consecutive reports (PI or CA) for any project, or for consecutive CAs for any project." NHA requests clarity as to whether an IC can perform consecutive PI's on a project. Additionally, NHA requests clarity in regard to Engineers-of-Record, it is not clear at what point an IC who performed an analysis of record can perform future CAs. For instance, can an IC review their own work if another IC does an interim review for a CA report? Or, after performing an analysis of record, is that IC no longer allowed to perform CA reports for that project?

NHA also suggests FERC provide definitions for the Chief Dam Safety Coordinator (CDSC) and Chief Dam Safety Engineer (CDSE) within Chapter 16. Specifically, section 16-3.2 provides a differentiation between the capabilities of each position without a definition. NHA suggests the requirement that a CDSE be on staff or hired as a consultant only apply to larger more complex projects.

i. 16-3.3.2 - IC Team Proposals

NHA requests clarity on the expected proposal process between an IC and licensee. It appears that a somewhat in-depth review of project information, as discussed in Section 16-3.3.2.1, is required by the IC firm before they can determine the appropriate makeup of the IC Team. This information is normally not available to the consultant prior to being hired through most procurement processes. NHA suggests FERC consider the procurement process that takes place between an IC and licensee, the IC proposal process proposed is not consistent with industry procurement processes.

Additionally, NHA requests clarity and detail on the provision that a single IC may be able to perform a PI or a CA without supporting team members for low risk projects.

j. 16-3.3.2.2 - Identification of IC Team Members

With regard to the identification of an IC Team member, section 16-3.3.2.2 states, "Note that the licensee is not permitted to serve as a facilitator for either a PFMA or RA for their own project". NHA suggests FERC consider allowing a licensee to facilitate a PFMA and (RA) under certain conditions where FERC has reviewed and approved of the qualified individual and participation is still required by the IC and other outside Subject Matter Experts (SME). NHA suggests the guidance be revised to require the IC or an independent member of the RA or PFMA team write the report, while the licensee facilitates.

Section 16-3.3.2.2 later states "if the IC does not serve as a facilitator, then the facilitator should not be employed be the same company or organization as the IC." NHA requests clarity as to the reason an IC and facilitator cannot be from the same firm.

NHA also requests clarity as to the circumstances in which more than one IC will be required to lead an IC Team.

k. 16.3.3.4 - Time to Submit the Part 12D Inspection Plan

With regard to section 16-3.3.4, the guidance strongly recommends that a licensee submit the Part 12D inspection plan to FERC one year in advance of the first IC Team activity. However, 16-2.5.4 FERC Dam Safety Personnel, Table 2 states submittal is to take place 6 months in advance. NHA respectfully requests that timelines be consistent across the proposed rule and supporting guidelines to allow for timely submittal of the plan.

I. 16.3.3.5 - FERC Review and Approval of Part 12D Inspection Plans

With regard to the provision stating that FERC may reject any proposed IC or IC Team member, NHA is concerned with how this provision will be implemented. NHA requests clarity as to the criteria FERC will utilize when considering a rejection of an IC.

m. 16-4.1 - Purpose

With regard to the PIPR, NHA suggests FERC notify a licensee within two weeks of submittal of the PIPR in cases where FERC determines the IC Team is not adequately prepared to perform the review and postpones the first IC Team activity.

n. 16-4.2 - Table 8: Pre-Inspection Preparation Report Requirements

NHA requests clarity with regard to the use of a PFMA within the PIPR process. 16-4.2 - Table 8 states "Draft revised PFM's developed by the IC team during their review of the information". However, section 16-6.6.2 indicates that no predetermined PFMA list is allowed prior to brainstorming and later states that the previous PFMA cannot be reviewed prior to the brainstorming session.

o. 16-5.2 - Review of Prior Reports

With regard to section 16-5.2, the second paragraph states IC Team members must have a full understanding of loading conditions that may indicate any Potential Failure Mode (PFM) is active or developing. This statement suggests that new work is required on the PFM for the PI, NHA requests clarity as to whether this is the intention of the requirement.

p. 16-5.4 - Review and Evaluation of Dam and Public Safety Programs

NHA is concerned with the requirement stating the IC is to review the Owners Dam Safety Program (ODSP) and the Public Safety Plan (PSP) within the Pl. This requirement could create significant exposure to liability for an IC who is highly qualified with respect to the technical and operational aspects of the project, but not with respect to evaluating organizational programs and effectiveness.

NHA respectfully requests this requirement be removed. The ODSP review should focus on policies, procedures and systems in place and not be tied to the specific technical analyses and condition of a dam. NHA also notes that owners with multiple projects may include several projects within their program.

If consideration of the removal of this requirement will not be given, NHA requests the IC's review be explicitly limited to adequacy and implementation of the ODSP or PSP at the project in question. As written, the requirement could be interpreted broadly to include scope already covered by five-year ODSP audits.

With regard to smaller projects, NHA believes the review of the ODSP by an IC Team and independent audit of the ODSP creates duplication of efforts. If FERC requires the IC Team review the ODSP, NHA requests the independent audit requirement be removed for smaller projects.

If FERC's intent under this requirement is that the IC only confirm that the ODSP and PSP are being implemented and a detailed review is not required, NHA asks that the guideline better state FERC's intention and the level of review required.

q. 16-5.4.2 - Performance Monitoring Program (Surveillance and Monitoring)

With regard to the performance monitoring program, NHA requests clarity as to what period of surveillance and monitoring data is required for review. For instance, is FERC requiring that the data be reviewed up through the calendar year of the inspection, until the field inspection date, or up to the submittal of the PIPR?

r. 16-5.4.4 - Emergency Action Plan

With regard to the emergency action plan, NHA requests clarity on the recommendation that an IC Team test warning systems. Additionally, NHA suggests that certain reviews be considered as acceptable alternatives for small projects. For instance, a situation in which two Emergency Action Plan (EAP) drills are conducted annually that include the testing of warning systems with an EAP status report submitted to FERC annually.

s. 16-6.3.1 - Review of Evaluation of Design Basis and Construction – General

With regard to section 16-6.31, the word "feature" is used to describe a portion of a project. NHA suggests FERC provide a definition of "feature" and consider revising all engineering guidelines to ensure consistency in reference to project descriptions.

t. 16-6.4.1 - Review of Evaluation of Previous Analysis – General

With regard to 16-6.4.1, NHA requests clarity on an IC's review of reports that have been submitted, but not yet approved by FERC. NHA inquires as to how inflight studies should be addressed, which often contain relevant information to a current Part 12 inspection.

u. 16-6.4.2 - Evaluation Requirements

With regard to evaluation requirements, 16.6.4.2 states the IC Team is to address the accuracy, relevance and consistency with the current state-of-the-practice of dam engineering and goes on to list several types of studies. NHA is concerned verifying studies regularly in addition to the cost of the Part 12 will place a heavy financial strain on small operators.

With regard to independent calculations, NHA suggests FERC revise this section to allow for a review of calculations done previously in order to determine they were performed correctly, in addition to requiring new calculations, so that deficiencies are identified. This revision will identify circumstances that may or may not require a more in-depth study or design. NHA also requests clarity as to the process that determines what confirmation hand calculations will be required.

Additionally, independent calculations, requires the IC to justify the urgency for new analyses, NHA suggests FERC add context in order to define timelines, i.e. urgent - next two years or less, moderate next 5 years or less, low next 10 years or less.

v. 16-6.5 - Review of the STID

NHA commends FERC in providing greater clarity to an IC Team's review of the Support Technical Information Document (STID). However, further clarity is needed as to any restrictions or limitations placed on an IC Team in updating a project's STID in conjunction with preparing the CAR. For instance, is it acceptable for the IC to update analyses in the STID in lieu of recommending that the analyses be updated?

w. 16-6.6.2 - Potential Failure Mode Analysis

NHA requests clarity with regard to the use of a PFMA within the PIPR process. Section 16-6.6.2 states that no predetermined PFMA list is permissible prior to the brainstorming session and later states that the previous PFMA cannot be reviewed prior to the brainstorming session. However, 16-4.2 - Table 8 states "Draft revised PFM's developed by the IC team during their review of the information". By not allowing use of the previous list, participants are forced to use creativity on repeat work, rather than focus on new failure modes. Additionally, this statement conflicts with Chapter 17-4.7.5.

x. 16.6.6.4 - Requirements for Review and Evaluation

With regard to the requirements for review and evaluation, the section defines IC Team roles as to their respective responsibility to PFMA and/or RA reports. NHA suggests a third option be considered in which the IC is part of a PFMA and/or RA team(s), is not responsible for the subject report, and is also not required to evaluate the report due to the fact they were part of the team. This suggested provision

would be contingent on the IC's review of the report throughout its development while having the ability to comment on any portions of the report they take exception with in the process.

y. 16-6.7.1 - Physical Field Inspections

With regard to physical field inspections, NHA requests clarity as to which supporting IC Team members are to attend the physical inspection. As written, this section can be interpreted as any one individual working on the project, including those supporting an IC that are not part of the IC Team.

Section 16-6.7.1 also states that every power source for gate operation must be used and tested at the time of the inspection. NHA suggests FERC allow an alternative option to demonstrate the backup generator or other energy sources are functional and provide electricity. The process of taking units offline to demonstrate back up equipment functionality is an abnormal operating condition and may lead to equipment issues. As an alternate option, NHA suggests this section require a review of startup procedures for use of the equipment, as well as current testing procedures to note flaws in these procedures. As a result, this option will better improve operations of the project and increase dam safety while confirming the proper function of the equipment.

Additionally, this section states that provisions shall be made to enable the IC Team and FERC staff to inspect typically inaccessible features, except those covered by a special inspection report. NHA requests clarity as to how recent the special inspection report must be and whether the intent is to inspect draft tubes, other underwater features and the like.

z. 16-6.8 - Review and Evaluation of Dam and Public Safety Programs

NHA is concerned with the requirement stating the IC is to review the Owners Dam Safety Program (ODSP) and the Public Safety Plan (PSP) within the CA and PI. This requirement could create significant exposure to liability for an IC who is highly qualified with respect to the technical and operational aspects of the project, but not with respect to evaluating organizational programs and effectiveness.

NHA respectfully requests this requirement be removed. The ODSP review should focus on policies, procedures and systems in place and not be tied to the specific technical analyses and condition of a dam. NHA also notes that owners with multiple projects may include several projects within their program.

If consideration of the removal of this requirement will not be given, NHA requests the IC's review be explicitly limited to adequacy and implementation of the ODSP or PSP at the project in question. As written, the requirement could be interpreted broadly to include scope already covered by five-year ODSP audits.

With regard to smaller projects, NHA believes the review of the ODSP by an IC Team and independent audit of the ODSP creates duplication of efforts. If FERC requires the IC Team review the ODSP, NHA requests the independent audit requirement be removed for smaller projects.

If FERC's intent under this requirement is that the IC only confirm that the ODSP and PSP are being implemented and a detailed review is not required, NHA asks that the guideline better state FERC's intention and the level of review required.

aa. 16-6.8.2 - Performance Monitoring Program (Surveillance and Monitoring)

With regard to the performance and monitoring program, NHA requests clarity as to what period of surveillance and monitoring data is required for review. For instance, is it required that the data be reviewed up through the calendar year of the inspection, until the field inspection date or up to the submittal of the Pre-Inspection Report?

With regard to the reference to senior personnel and qualified personnel later in the section, NHA requests FERC clarify the classifications.

bb. 16-6.9.2 - Conditions Affecting Spillway Capacity

With regard to conditions affecting spillway capacity, NHA requests clarity and notes concern with regard to consistency between different projects, various analytical approaches and regulatory review. It is unclear as to what is deemed an acceptable level of risk. It is also unclear what level of analysis regarding component reliability will be necessary.

cc. 16-6.9.3 - Consequences of Inadequate Capacity

With regard to consequence of inadequate capacity, NHA requests clarity as to how this section relates to section 16-6.9.2 - conditions affecting spillway capacity. For instance, does the evaluation of potential effects as described in section 16-6.9.3 apply to all conditions described in section 16-6.9.2; or must there be some basis for believing conditions described in 16-6.9.2 could occur before the effects must be determined? NHA suggests the 16-6.9.3 evaluation of effects apply only to 16-6.9.2 conditions that would constitute or be comparable to Category I and III PFMs (highlighted or more information needed), and not to Category II or IV PFMs (not highlighted or ruled out).

The second bullet within 16-6.9.3 states, "How reliable are the operating equipment and power sources? What does historic data show with respect to jamming and/or failure-to-operate?" NHA inquires as to whether these questions are more appropriately related to the prior section 16-6.9.2 Conditions Affecting Spillway Capacity.

dd. 16-6.10.2 - Project Description

With regard to the paragraph Summary of Identified Potential Failure Modes within 16-6.10.2, NHA requests clarity as to whether the intent is to include a summary of the most recent PFMs or all historical PFMs are to be included for each project feature.

ee. 16-7.1 - General

With regard to the table documenting any identified risk reduction measure associated with PFMs classified as "urgent" or "credible", NHA requests clarity as to whether all brainstormed potential risk reduction measures are to be included, or only those that are deemed to be recommended by the IC team.

ff. 16-7.2 - No Action and Alternatives

With regard to section 16-7.2 a licensee may disagree with the PIR or CAR, and may propose no action or an alternative. FERC may still require the licensee to complete the recommendations provided by the IC or risk reduction measures. NHA requests clarity as to the process of appeal in cases where a licensee disagrees with FERC's requirement to complete the recommendations provided by the IC. NHA inquires as to whether FERC has considered an Appeals Board or Board of Consultants that may offer guidance in all aspects of the Part 12 process in cases where technical expertise is lacking. Additionally, in a circumstance where a licensee intends to propose an alternative to a PIR or CAR, a discussion is to occur with the IC and FERC after the report, but prior to the submittal of the plan and schedule. NHA inquires as to what venue the discussion is to be held.

gg. 16-7.5 - Comprehensive Assessment Review Meeting

With regard to the comprehensive assessment review meeting, NHA suggests that "Table 8" be edited to "Table 11". Additionally, in a circumstance where a licensee disagrees with a particular area of the IC report, NHA inquires as to whether a discussion may take place within the comprehensive assessment review meeting or if discussion is not permissible and the licensee is to follow the process indicated within section 16-7.2.

hh. Appendix B: Outline for the Periodic Inspection Report

With regard to a licensee providing a companion digital reference, NHA suggests FERC approve the use of secured share drives as a possible alternative. As cyber security becomes a large driver for discontinued use of external thumb drives and other media to protect company assets, this alternative allows for secure sharing of the digital copy and a "living" or "live" document approach to updating information. Additionally, limited to 50MB per filing within the eFERC library, CDs and DVDs do not contain the required space unless a licensee utilizes several disks.

Additionally, NHA suggests the requirement for a hard copy be removed, as digital reference is already required and can be more easily updated as a "living" document.

III. Conclusion

Once again, NHA appreciates the opportunity to comment on Chapter 16 – Part 12D Program of the Engineering Guidelines for the Evaluation of Projects. NHA commends FERC for exploring ways the D2SI program can be changed to further enhance the safety and stability of the nation's non-federal hydropower dams. We hope FERC considers the areas of agreement, identified challenges and alternatives presented within our response to the guideline.

NHA appreciates the opportunity to provide these comments and discuss this important public safety topic.