

dependent utilities, environmental, public consumer groups, competitive transmission developers, and independent power producer & exempt wholesale generator stakeholder sectors in MISO, as well as the Attorney General of Michigan and several prominent trade associations and consumer advocate organizations.

I. COMMUNICATIONS

The Joint MISO Stakeholder Sector Participants request that all communications, correspondence, documents and other materials related to this proceeding should be addressed to the following persons:

On behalf of DTE Electric Company:

Rosemary Smalls-Tilford
Manager, Regulatory Affairs
DTE Electric Company
One Energy Plaza, 1295 WCB
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 235-8579
Rosemary.smalls-tilford@dteenergy.com

Leah Chamberlin*
Associate General Counsel
DTE Electric Company
One Energy Plaza, 1635 WCB
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 235-3165
leah.chamberlin@dteenergy.com

Jane E. Rueger*
Fredrick Wilson
White & Case LLP
701 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 626-6534
jrueger@whitecase.com
fredrick.wilson@whitecase.com

On behalf of Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.:

Cortlandt C. Choate Jr.*
Senior Attorney
Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.
4902 North Biltmore Lane
Madison WI, 53718
(608) 458-6217
CortlandtChoate@alliantenergy.com

On behalf of Michigan Environmental Council:

Charlotte Jameson*
Program Director Legislative Affairs,
Energy, and Drinking Water Policy
Michigan Environmental Council
602 W. Ionia St.
Lansing, MI 48933
(517) 487-9539

charlotte@environmentalcouncil.org

On behalf of Minnesota Department of
Commerce:

Kate O'Connell*
Supervisor, Energy Regulation & Planning
Minnesota Department of Commerce
85 7th Place East, Suite 280
St. Paul, MN 55101-2198
(651) 539-1815
kate.oconnell@state.mn.us

Nancy A. Campbell
Analyst Coordinator - Financial
Minnesota Department of Commerce
85 7th Place East, Suite 280
St. Paul, MN 55101-2198
(651) 539-1821
nancy.campbell@state.mn

On behalf of Citizens Against Rate
Excess:

John R Liskey*
Counsel
Citizens Against Rate Excess
921 N. Washington Ave
Lansing, MI 48906
(517) 913-5105
john@liskeypllc.com

On behalf of Consumers Energy
Company:

Emerson J. Hilton*
Corporate Counsel
Consumers Energy Company
One Energy Plaza
Jackson, Michigan 49201
(517) 788-1241
emerson.hilton@cmsenergy.com

On behalf of Citizens Utility Board of
Wisconsin:

Tom Content*
Executive Director
Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin
6401 Odana Rd., Suite 24
Madison, WI 53719
(608) 251-3322
content@cubwi.org

Corey Singletary*
Utility Analyst
Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin
6401 Odana Rd., Suite 24
Madison, WI 53719
(608) 251-3322
singletary@cubwi.org

On behalf of Invenergy Storage
Development LLC:

Ann Coultas*
Manager, Regulatory Affairs
Invenergy, LLC
One South Wacker Drive, Suite 1800
Chicago, IL 60606
(317) 519-3792
acoultas@invenergyllc.com

On behalf of Michigan Department of
Attorney General:

Michael Moody*
Assistant Attorney General
Michigan Department of Attorney
General
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, MI 48909
(517) 335-7627

moodym2@michigan.gov

On behalf of EDF Renewables
Development, Inc.:

Daniel R. Simon*
Clark Hill PLC
1001 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Suite 1300 South
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 572-8669
dsimon@clarkhill.com

On behalf of National Hydropower
Association:

Malcolm Woolf
President and CEO
National Hydropower Association
601 New Jersey Ave NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
202-682-1700
MWoolf@hydro.org

On behalf of Clean Grid Alliance:

Rhonda Peters*
Principal
InterTran Energy Consulting
1610 S Valentine Way
Lakewood, CO 80228
(720) 319-1860
intertranec@gmail.com

On behalf of Citizens Utility Board of
Michigan:

Amy Bandyk*
Executive Director
Citizens Utility Board of Michigan
921 N. Washington Ave
Lansing, MI 48906
(248) 385-3167
amy.bandyk@cubofmichigan.org

On behalf of RWE Renewables
Americas, LLC:

Paul Varnado*
Assistant General Counsel
RWE Renewables Americas, LLC0
353 N. Clark Street, 30th Floor
Chicago, IL 60654
(312) 358-9873
paul.varnado@rwe.com

Bruce A. Grabow*
Locke Lord LLP
701 8th Street, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 220-6991
bgrabow@lockelord.com

On behalf of American Wind
Energy Association:

Gabe Tabak*
Counsel
American Wind Energy Association
1501 M St. NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 383-2500

Daniel Hall
Central Region Director, Electricity and
Transmission Policy
American Wind Energy Association
1501 M St NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 383-2500

gtabak@awea.org

dhall@awea.org

On behalf of AWEA and the Solar Council:

On behalf of Savion, LLC:

Steven Shparber*
Counsel
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 689-2994
steven.shparber@nelsonmullins.com

Derek Sunderman*
Vice President Transmission
Savion, LLC
422 Admiral Boulevard
Kansas City, MO. 64106
(785) 766-7613
dsunderman@savionenergy.com

On behalf of Sustainable FERC Project:

On behalf of Natural Resources Defense Council:

John N. Moore*
Senior Attorney and Director
Sustainable FERC Project
20 North Wacker Street, Suite 1600
Chicago, IL 60201
(312) 651-7927
Moore.fercproject@gmail.com

Elizabeth Toba Pearlman*
Renewable Energy Advocate/Senior
Attorney
Natural Resources Defense Council
20 North Wacker Dr., Suite 1600
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 995-5907
TPEARLMAN@NRDC.ORG

On behalf of LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC:

Michael R. Engleman*
Engleman Fallon, PLLC
1717 K Street, NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 464-1332
E-mail: mengleman@efenergylaw.com

*Persons denoted with an asterisk are those designated for service pursuant to section 385.2010 of the Commission's regulations.² The Joint MISO Stakeholder Sector Participants respectfully

² 18 C.F.R. § 385.2010.

request that the Commission permit the inclusion of more than two persons on the service list, given the joint nature of this submission.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The SATOA Proposal is unlawful because it creates an unduly discriminatory preference for storage projects proposed by Transmission Owners (TO Projects) over identical storage projects proposed by non-TOs (Non-TO Projects). MISO's SATOA Proposal is unduly discriminatory because it creates a mechanism for selection of TO Projects in MTEP that is not available to identical Non-TO Projects that address identical issues in MISO. Whether a particular storage asset is proposed by a TO or a Non-TO, both will have the same electrical capability and physical opportunity to function identically within MISO. In short, both are similarly situated, yet MISO would provide TOs with a faster process, cost and competitive advantage to the detriment of Non-TOs. MISO's SATOA Proposal is textbook discriminatory.

The SATOA Proposal is also contrary to Commission precedent in FERC Order No. 841³ and policy in the ESR Cost-Based Recovery Policy Statement.⁴ Specifically, the SATOA Proposal ignores FERC's requirement that MISO revise its tariff to remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources. The SATOA Proposal is **not** "a set of tariff provisions that will help facilitate the participation of electric storage resources in the RTO/ISO markets."⁵ Although MISO characterizes its SATOA Proposal as distinct from its Order No. 841 compliance obligation, the two cannot be viewed in isolation. Installed storage – whether owned by a TO or a Non-TO –

³ *Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators*, Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2018).

⁴ *Utilization of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple Services when Receiving Cost-based Rate Recovery*, 158 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2017) ("ESR Cost-Based Recovery Policy Statement").

⁵ SATOA Proposal Cover Letter at P 3.

will electrically function the same in the MISO market. Hence, it is necessary for the Commission to judge MISO's SATOA Proposal in light of its Order No. 841 determinations.

The initial "storage as transmission asset" (SATA) proposal introduced by MISO in the Planning Advisory Committee (PAC) would have applied to both TO Projects and Non-TO Projects and was intended to permit SATA projects to participate in addressing transmission needs and participate in the energy markets consistent with Order No. 841.⁶ In response, the TOs advocated for a "transmission-only" SATA, which MISO adopted and quickly developed into the SATOA Proposal, despite stakeholder input that "SATA should not be limited to incumbent TOs."⁷ Notably, MISO subsequently ignored a majority sector vote of the PAC that sought to ensure equal treatment of electric storage between TOs and Non-TOs. MISO's decision to ignore the PAC's recommendation in favor of the SATOA Proposal demonstrates a lack of independence from the will of its TO members. This is particularly troubling because "the principle of independence is the bedrock upon which the ISO must be built."⁸

MISO's proposal also contravenes the Commission's bedrock principle of comparability established in Order No. 888 and the undue discrimination that the Commission remedied therein. The SATOA Proposal results in an undue competitive advantage granted to electric storage resources proposed by MISO TOs based solely on the identity of the proponent.

⁶ See "Electric Storage as a Transmission Solution in the MTEP Reliability Planning Process" presentation by MISO to the Planning Advisory Committee (PAC), dated Sept. 26, 2018, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20180926%20PAC%20Item%2004e%20Energy%20Storage%20as%20Transmission%20Reliability%20Asset277718.pdf>.

⁷ "Electric Storage as a Transmission Asset (SATA)" presentation by MISO to the PAC, dated Nov. 14, 2018, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20181114%20PAC%20Item%2004c%20Electric%20Storage%20as%20a%20Transmission%20Asset%20SATA%20Presentation292116.pdf>.

⁸ *Regional Transmission Organizations*, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 at P 193 (Order 2000).

MISO's proposal further fails to address how SATOAs will impact numerous aspects of the wholesale markets and how proposed generation in MISO's generation interconnection procedures (GIP) will be held harmless. MISO has failed to provide details about these and other issues that are addressed below. As such, its Proposal is unsupported, has not been shown to be just and reasonable, and should be rejected as patently deficient consistent with Commission precedent.⁹

In sum, MISO's SATOA Proposal should be rejected, and MISO should be directed to develop a just and reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential proposal to allow both TO Projects and Non-TO Projects to participate via the same means, whether that is through MISO's MTEP, GIP and some streamlined process.¹⁰ Alternatively, if the SATOA Proposal is not rejected, the Commission should condition its acceptance of the proposal on MISO revising it to address the critical issues identified in Section IV.F below and provide MISO the opportunity to agree.

III. BACKGROUND

After the issuance of the ESR Cost-based Recovery Policy Statement in 2017, MISO formed the Energy Storage Task Force (ESTF) to address emerging storage issues. As evidenced by an Issue Submission Form presented at the March 2018 Stakeholder Steering Committee Meeting, the ESTF quickly identified planning for electric storage as a transmission solution in the

⁹ See, e.g., *Southwest Power Pool, Inc.*, 136 FERC ¶ 61,097 at P 9 (2011) (rejecting SPP's tariff revisions designed to curtail non-dispatchable resources in the SPP Energy Imbalance Service market during periods of congestion as patently deficient because they were unsupported and unexplained); See, e.g., *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Virginia Electric and Power Co.*, 162 FERC ¶ 61,136 at P 25 (2018) ("The Commission cannot determine the justness and reasonableness of Dominion's proposal *given the lack of evidence to support the existence of the problem and the solution to the potential problem*. . . . Based on the record before us, we find Dominion's justification for its proposal inadequate, and reject the instant filing.").

¹⁰ Some stakeholders have suggested that TO and non-TO storage used in reliability applications could go through an expedited GIP process, similar to existing "Generator Replacement" policies.

MTEP Reliability Planning Process as an issue.¹¹ On June 13, 2018, the ESTF introduced “Storage as a Transmission Solution in the MTEP Reliability Planning Process” to the PAC in a presentation and issue paper that addressed, among other things, whether a Generation Interconnection Agreement (GIA) should be required for electric storage resources that only address a transmission need.¹²

This marked the beginning of an eighteen-month period in which the concept of storage as a transmission asset was hotly debated in the MISO stakeholder process. MISO’s initial strawman proposal was delivered to the PAC on September 26, 2018 and contemplated participation by storage projects as transmission *and* in the energy markets consistent with Order No. 841.¹³ This SATA proposal was discussed at several stakeholder meetings, and in a presentation dated November 14, 2018, MISO recorded the TOs’ position that transmission-only storage assets be exempted from the generator interconnection queue.¹⁴

Thereafter, on January 9, 2019, MISO changed direction and delivered the SATOA Phase I Policy Proposal to the PAC as a topic for discussion.¹⁵ While the proposal acknowledged the

¹¹ “Issue Submission Form” submitted by Energy Storage Task Force, dated March 7, 2018, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20180328%20SC%20Item%2002%20Issue%20Submission%20-%20Storage%20as%20Reliability%20Project155589.pdf>

¹² “Electric Storage as a Transmission Solution in the MTEP Reliability Planning Process” presented by Energy Storage Task Force, dated June 3, 2018, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20180613%20PAC%20Item%2003c%20Energy%20Storage%20as%20Transmission%20Reliability%20Asset219727.pdf>

¹³ “Electric Storage as a Transmission Solution in the MTEP Reliability Planning Process” presented by Energy Storage Task Force, dated Sep. 26, 2018, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20180926%20PAC%20Item%2004e%20Energy%20Storage%20as%20Transmission%20Reliability%20Asset277718.pdf>

¹⁴ “Electric Storage as a Transmission Asset (SATA)” presented by Energy Storage Task Force, dated Nov. 14, 2018, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20181114%20PAC%20Item%2004c%20Electric%20Storage%20as%20a%20Transmission%20Asset%20SATA%20Presentation292116.pdf>

¹⁵ “Electric Storage as a Transmission Solution in the MTEP Reliability Planning Process: Phase I Proposal – For Discussion” presented by Energy Storage Task Force, dated Jan. 09, 2019, available at [https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190109%20PAC%20Item%2003c%20Storage%20as%20a%20Transmission%20Asset%20Phase%20I%20Proposal%20\(PAC%20004\)307822.pdf](https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190109%20PAC%20Item%2003c%20Storage%20as%20a%20Transmission%20Asset%20Phase%20I%20Proposal%20(PAC%20004)307822.pdf) (SATO A Phase I Policy Proposal)

complexity of issues raised by the use of storage to address transmission reliability issues and participate in markets, it only proposed to focus on electric storage to address transmission reliability issues, adopting the limited approach suggested by TOs.¹⁶ On April 17, 2019, DTE Electric submitted a motion to the PAC for MISO to include provisions in the SATOA Proposal to likewise allow non-transmission alternative storage projects to be exempted from the GIP and connect to the transmission system via Storage Interconnection Agreements (SIAs).¹⁷ The motion passed with 68.75% of the sector votes in favor. MISO, however, summarily rejected the majority stakeholder will, stating a “fundamental disagreement with the position that an asset that is used exclusively to address a transmission issue and that is connected to the transmission system is a non-transmission asset – it is a transmission asset.”¹⁸ Several rounds of stakeholder discussion were held thereafter, with MISO ultimately filing the SATOA Proposal with the Commission on December 12, 2019, in this docket.

IV. PROTEST

A. MISO’s SATOA Proposal Is Unlawful Because It Is Unduly Discriminatory And Preferential

The SATOA Proposal is unlawful because it creates an unduly discriminatory preference for TO Projects over identical Non-TO Projects. The Commission has explained that, electric storage is different than traditional wires-based assets: “[e]lectric storage resources have the ability both to charge and discharge electricity and can provide a variety of grid services to multiple

¹⁶ SATOA Phase I Policy Proposal at P 8 (“Based on consideration of the complexity in resolving all aspects of the comprehensive treatment of electric storage assets operating to provide both transmission services and market services, MISO is proposing to phase the policy development.”).

¹⁷ Motion submitted to Planning Advisory Committee by DTE, dated April 17, 2019, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190417%20PAC%20Item%2003%20DTE%20Motion%20for%20Storage%20as%20NTA335516.pdf>

¹⁸ “Electric Storage as a Transmission-Only Asset (SATO A) Phase I Policy Proposal (PAC 004)” presentation to PAC dated May 13, 2019, available at [https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190515%20PAC%20Item%2005%20SATO A%20\(PAC004\)344407.pdf](https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190515%20PAC%20Item%2005%20SATO A%20(PAC004)344407.pdf).

entities (e.g., RTO/ISOs, transmission and distribution utilities) or in multiple markets. In addition, these resources are able to provide multiple services almost instantaneously and can switch from providing one service to another almost instantaneously. As such, electric storage resources may fit into one or more of the traditional asset functions of generation, transmission and distribution.”¹⁹ Thus, an electric storage asset owned by a TO can be identical in form and function to an electric storage asset owned by a Non-TO.

MISO argues that it is only proposing that storage address needs that arise in its MTEP and thus equates such storage to a transmission facility; MISO then makes the leap that only a TO, therefore, can be allowed to propose such storage. Whether storage is added to the grid by a TO or Non-TO and via MTEP or the GIP, the functions and interaction with the MISO market will be the same. MISO suggests in its SATOA Proposal that SATOA resources will operate in a limited grid services role, and therefore they will have no impact on energy markets. MISO acknowledges in its filing that it will have to address the impact of SATOA resources on energy markets in the future²⁰ as if the effects of SATOA resources on energy markets won’t occur until these storage resources are permitted to sell excess energy into the markets. In the end, storage injects and withdraws power from the grid no matter the avenue by which it becomes part of the MISO market. Such injections and withdrawals will inevitably affect energy markets in a manner detrimental to non-TOs that otherwise would have proposed storage projects as a transmission asset.²¹

Electric storage projects, whether proposed by a TO or Non-TO, are “similarly situated.”

¹⁹ ESR Cost-Based Recovery Policy Statement at P 2.

²⁰ See SATOA Proposal Cover Letter at 9 (“MISO will be reviewing the framework for how a facility approved as a transmission asset may also serve a market function.”).

²¹ The adverse impacts addressed herein do not arise from “an electric storage resource receiving cost-based rate recovery while concurrently receiving compensation for market-based rate services” (ESR Cost-Based Recovery Policy Statement at P 20) but from MISO’s discriminatory SATOA Proposal and the manner in which electric storage (whether TO Project or Non-TO Project) injects and withdraws electricity from the grid.

The U.S. Courts of Appeal have explained that the purpose of the undue discrimination clause of the FPA is to ensure that similarly situated market participants are afforded equal treatment:

[D]ifferences in rates are justified when they are predicated upon differences in facts – cost of service or otherwise – and where there exists a difference in rates which is attacked as illegally discriminatory, judicial inquiry devolves on the question of whether the record exhibits factual differences to justify classifications among customers and differences among the rates charged them.²²

There are no differences in fact, cost of service, or otherwise that justify allowing a MISO TO to bypass the GIP and propose storage projects through the MTEP but not afford the same opportunity to a non-TO. TO Projects and Non-TO Projects have the same physical capabilities, can serve the same reliability functions, and will eventually participate in MISO markets in the same manner. Both sets of stakeholders are similarly situated. It is patently discriminatory to subject Non-TO Projects to a different set of rules and costs to participate in the same fashion as TO Projects.²³ A decision by the Commission to permit such a discriminatory scheme is by its nature arbitrary and capricious, and thus impermissible.²⁴

MISO's SATOA Proposal is unduly discriminatory because it creates a mechanism for the selection of TO Projects in MTEP that is not available to identical Non-TO Projects that address identical reliability issues.²⁵ For example, a transmission-dependent utility, such as DTE Electric

²² *St. Michaels Municipal Utils. Comm'n v. FPC*, 377 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1967); *see also Cities of Newark, DE, et al. v. FERC*, 763 F.2d 533 (3rd Cir. 1985).

²³ *See Dynegy Midwest Generation, Inc. v. FERC*, 633 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“*Dynegy Midwest*”). In *Dynegy Midwest*, the Court equated the recovery of costs associated with the provision of reactive power with transmission costs, and reasoned that equal treatment of transmission costs was “critical” to assuring “competitive equality.”

²⁴ *See, e.g., West Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC*, 766 F.3d 10, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing *Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar*, 708 F.3d 209, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency offers insufficient reasons for treating similar situations differently.”)).

²⁵ As a practical reality, electric storage projects are much more likely to qualify as baseline reliability projects in MTEP than multi-value projects (MVP) or market efficiency projects (MEP). An MEP has a rated voltage of 345 kV or above, has total project costs of five million dollars (\$5,000,000) or more, among other requirements. An MVP in turn must have a total capital cost of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) or more. As projected by NREL, utility grade electric storage projects are projected to cost \$1,200/kW by the early 2020s. Moreover, such costs are projected to continue to decline. “Battery Storage in MISO” presented at MISO Advisory Committee Meeting by the Brattle Group, dated Dec. 11, 2019, available at

which pays a significant amount of the transmission costs of the local TO, should have the same opportunity to install storage to address reliability needs if it can do so at a lower cost. Likewise, independent generation developers and owners (IPPs) should have the same opportunity to address reliability needs that are anticipated to arise with new proposed generation. MISO's SATOA Proposal, however, is proposed exclusively for TOs. This undue preference severely impairs development of Non-TO Projects, to the TOs' advantage, by (1) allowing TO Projects to bypass the lengthy GIP applicable to Non-TO Projects, (2) allowing TO Projects to interconnect to the transmission system more quickly via an abbreviated study process not available to Non-TO Projects, (3) allowing TO Projects to avoid network upgrade transmission costs that Non-TO Projects must absorb, and (4) allowing TOs to recover a guaranteed rate of return on capital and the costs of charging energy while Non-TO Projects must depend solely on market revenues. MISO's SATOA Proposal is patently discriminatory and should be rejected.

1. MISO's SATOA Proposal provides an undue preference to TOs by allowing TO Projects to bypass the GIP and unduly discriminates against Non-TOs by requiring Non-TO Projects to be processed in the GIP

Because only TO Projects will qualify under the SATOA Proposal, MISO's proposal results in two different paths to interconnection for storage facilities capable of providing identical services based *solely* on whether the project is a TO Project or a Non-TO Project. Such disparate treatment is unduly discriminatory. Under the SATOA Proposal, TO Projects are not subject to the GIP and can bypass the generator interconnection queue.²⁶ An identical Non-TO Project,

https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/17814_battery_storage_in_miso.pdf. Because of these economic factors, electric storage projects would need to be sized well beyond any practical application to satisfy the selection criteria for multi-value projects or market efficiency projects. Consequently, when considered in conjunction with the right of first refusal granted to TOs to construct baseline reliability projects on their respective transmission systems, the SATOA Proposal will effectively prevent non-TOs from developing electric storage projects to address reliability issues through any MISO planning process.

²⁶ SATOA Proposal at 23.

capable of resolving the same grid service transmission issues, requires the additional step of entering, providing financial Milestones and being studied in MISO's generator interconnection queue, obtaining an executed GIA and agreeing to pay for required network upgrades (if needed) before consideration for MTEP.²⁷ MISO's SATOA Proposal relegates Non-TO Projects to the GIP process even where such projects are not designed solely to serve a generation function, such as where a storage project will serve a distribution or generation function and may also resolve a transmission issue.

The delays inherent to MISO's generator interconnection queue are no secret; it takes a minimum of five hundred (500) days to navigate the generator interconnection process,²⁸ and currently can take over one thousand (1,000) days to complete.²⁹ MISO recognized during the stakeholder process that the GIP would act as a barrier to storage, noting that "[d]elays in the queue process could eliminate SATA usefulness as reliability solutions to an issue in any MTEP."³⁰ Under the SATOA Proposal, TOs would avoid this delay. TO Projects would be approved via MTEP. Identical Non-TO Projects would not. Non-TO Projects would have to wait years for the GIP to run its course. Identical TO Projects would not. This is preferential and discriminatory.

²⁷ See Proposed Attachment FF Section G.1a. ("Storage as Non-Transmission Alternatives ... storage facilities that are not proposed as SATOA may be considered as alternatives to transmission assets to address system needs when participating as generation or demand-side resources.")

²⁸ Generator Interconnection Process Timeline available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/GI%20Process%20Flow%20Diagram106549.pdf>

²⁹ Current DPP Phase Schedule, dated Jan. 1, 2020, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Definitive%20Planning%20Phase%20Estimated%20Schedule106547.pdf>. By example, DTE's proposed Blue Water Combined Cycle project in DPP East ITC Feb 2017 on the above spreadsheet has now languished over 900 days in the GIP.

³⁰ "Electric Storage as a Transmission Asset (SATA)" presentation by MISO to the PAC, dated Nov. 14, 2018, available at <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20181114%20PAC%20Item%2004c%20Electric%20Storage%20as%20a%20Transmission%20Asset%20SATA%20Presentation292116.pdf>.

In addition to delay, the GIP exposes Non-TO Projects to substantial costs in financial Milestone payments and study costs that TO Projects avoid as SATOA. Furthermore, if a TO elects to withdraw the development of its TO Project at the last minute, it incurs no financial harm under the SATOA Proposal, nor is it subject to a harm test. Conversely, if a Non-TO Project which goes through the GIP withdraws at the last minute, a harm test is performed that could result in the forfeiture of substantial funds.³¹ The cost differential to compete is per se preferential and discriminatory.

The study processes also are different. In MTEP, MISO focuses on local balancing area dispatch³² primarily to meet on-peak load demands, and identifies mitigations to meet those needs when redispatch does not solve the constraint.³³ In the GIP, MISO studies generation dispatched system-wide during on-peak and off-peak conditions with new generators dispatched at set fuel-based output levels in both scenarios,³⁴ and without reliance on redispatch to solve constraints. By way of just one example, in MTEP “shoulder studies,” wind is dispatched at 40% of nameplate to identify constraints for mitigation if redispatch does not resolve the constraint, while in the DPP shoulder studies, wind is dispatched at 100% of nameplate for constraint mitigation. While the MTEP studies may indicate no constraints, the DPP will identify significant constraints. This same type of result will materialize when storage is studied in MTEP versus DPP studies (storage is dispatched at 100% in DPP models) inhibiting the development of Non-TO Projects.³⁵ Suffice it

³¹ MISO OATT, Attachment X, Section 7.8

³² BPM-020-r21 Effective Date: JAN-01-2020, Section 4.3.3.2: “A firm LBA dispatch requires that firm resources contractually obligated to serve the Load of a particular LSE must be used, and should be economically dispatched to the degree possible subject to generating unit, transmission, and LBA power balance constraints.

³³ BPM-020-r21 Effective Date: JAN-01-2020 Figure P.9-1 “Overall Process Steps” Page 222 of 229.

³⁴ BPM-015-r20 section 6.1.1.2 “Study Case Development” Page 44.

³⁵ This is a significant problem in the MISO West sub-region, for example. In the MISO West Feb 2017 DPP, the amount of generation continuing in the queue dropped from 3,421 MW to 245 MW because of major constraint backbone network upgrade needs. See https://cdn.misoenergy.org/GI-DPP-2017-FEB%20West-Phase1_System_Impact_Report_PUBLIC328980.pdf; <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/GI-DPP-2017-FEB-West->

to say, TO Projects would not be subjected to the same study rigors and constraints and network upgrades that Non-TO Project would face. This too is patently discriminatory and preferential.

Moreover, the abbreviated study process inherent to the MTEP will allow TOs to predetermine their TO Projects' impact on the transmission system and thus assess their future ability to participate in wholesale markets once MISO determines "how future modifications to the planning process and market operations can facilitate storage participation in MISO markets and as transmission assets."³⁶ The advantage TO Projects would thus have connecting to the transmission system would be enhanced by competitive intelligence gathered during the abbreviated study process, enabling them to identify the limits of their operation before network upgrades are needed, and the potential cost of such upgrades. Non-TOs would not be provided the same foreknowledge and would be at a competitive disadvantage.

The ability for TO Projects to be selected in MTEP without navigating the GIP provides an insurmountable competitive advantage to TO Projects over Non-TO Projects and is unduly discriminatory. The abbreviated study process must be available to both TO Projects and Non-TO Projects to avoid such a discriminatory and preferential advantage.

2. MISO's SATOA Proposal unduly discriminates against Non-TO Projects by failing to evaluate them on a comparable basis to TO Projects

The SATOA Proposal is also unduly discriminatory because it is inconsistent with MISO's commitment to evaluate transmission projects and non-transmission alternatives on a comparable basis. MISO's Business Practice Manual No. 20 for the Transmission Planning Process provides:

Phase3_System_Impact_Report_PUBLIC391580.pdf. New generation in MISO West is not expected to be able to interconnect until backbone upgrades are built, which can easily take 8-12 years or longer. In DPP, storage is required to be dispatched at 100% in both shoulder and on peak models, regardless of its intended use or application, preventing it from coming online in MISO West until backbone upgrades are built in 8+ years. TO Projects, however, will not face this barrier to entry because SATOA enters through the MTEP.

³⁶ SATOA Proposal at 24.

Once issues are identified, the planning process **will explore alternative solutions to those issues with the objective of recommending the best overall solutions.** Consistent with Attachment FF of the Tariff, both transmission and Non-Transmission Alternatives (NTA) to resolve Transmission Issues will be considered on a comparable basis within the MISO transmission planning process.³⁷ (emphasis added)

This process recognizes that storage as NTAs can provide significant benefits and contemplates that NTAs will be evaluated in a least-cost, comparable and non-discriminatory manner, regardless of whether the storage asset will serve another function, such as a distribution or generation function, in addition to resolving transmission issues.³⁸ While MISO's proposed amendment to Attachment FF Section II.G.3 filed in this docket provides that "storage facilities that are not proposed as SATOA may be considered as alternatives to transmission assets to address system needs *when participating as generation or demand-side resources*," in reality Non-TO Projects cannot be evaluated in a non-discriminatory manner if the SATOA Proposal is implemented. This is because Non-TO Projects will have to complete the GIP. Further, it is Joint MISO Stakeholder Sector Participants' understanding that Non-TO Projects must already have a GIA before MISO will consider the Non-TO Project as an NTA in the MTEP to address a reliability issue. A TO Project need not have any such GIA; it simply needs to be proposed and can be evaluated and approved immediately. While a Non-TO Project designed to fill an identified reliability need may make it through the years-long GIP process, obtain a GIA and be considered as a least-cost NTA in a subsequent year, it will be too late: the TO Project designed to fill the identical reliability need will already be in MTEP since it was not subjected to the same delays as the Non-TO Project.

³⁷ MISO Business Practice Manual 020: MISO Transmission Planning Process §4.3.1.2.

³⁸ See also the preamble to the Energy Storage Association policy statement on storage as transmission which states that "storage should be considered as a non-transmission alternative (NTA) where competitive market-based resources may address underlying transmission needs in a cost-effective manner." Available at <https://energystorage.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019-Policy-Position-Storage-as-Transmission.pdf>.

Hence, in reality, MISO will not assess transmission and NTA proposals on a comparable basis contrary to its BPM and proposed Tariff language.

3. MISO’s SATOA Proposal unduly discriminates against Non-TO Projects by allowing TO Projects to avoid transmission costs that Non-TO Projects must absorb and allowing TO Projects to recover a guaranteed rate of return on capital and the cost of charging energy while Non-TO Projects must depend solely on market revenues

The SATOA Proposal is also unduly discriminatory because it allows TO Projects to avoid charges for transmission service that are imposed on Non-TO Projects. Under the SATOA Proposal, “[n]o Transmission Service charges are applicable to the operation of a SATOA”³⁹ because “its operation is under the direction of MISO for transmission purposes.”⁴⁰ By contrast, transmission service charges would be applicable to Non-TO Projects that utilize transmission service. Moreover, TO Projects’ return on capital and charging costs would be recovered through cost-based transmission rates, whereas Non-TO Projects are dependent solely on the energy market revenues to cover these same costs.⁴¹ This disparate treatment provides TO Projects far more financial certainty than Non-TO Projects and is unduly discriminatory and preferential.

For all these reasons, MISO’s SATOA Proposal should be found to be patently discriminatory and preferential and thus rejected.

B. MISO’s SATOA Proposal Is In Direct Contravention Of Commission Policy Because It Creates Barriers To The Participation Of Electric Storage Resources

³⁹ Proposed Attachment FF Section G.5.

⁴⁰ SATOA Proposal at 22.

⁴¹ Proposed Attachment FF Section G.6 (“Costs resulting from Market Activities of a SATOA directed under the Transmission Provider’s functional control shall be collected through transmission rates in a manner consistent with the treatment of costs associated with the transmission project type that the SATOA is included in Appendix A of the MTEP pursuant to Section II.G.1.d.iii. As an example, costs for charging a SATOA battery storage device may be included in transmission rates in a manner consistent with the inclusion in transmission rates as a Baseline Reliability Project if the battery storage device operates to serve as a Baseline Reliability Project.”).

Electric storage resources do not fit neatly into one functional category because they are capable of providing the services of generation, transmission, and distribution, and can also behave like load. As the Commission has explained:

Electric storage resources have the ability both to charge and discharge electricity and can provide a variety of grid services to multiple entities (e.g., RTO/ISOs, transmission and distribution utilities) or in multiple markets. In addition, these resources are able to provide multiple services almost instantaneously and can switch from providing one service to another almost instantaneously. *As such, electric storage resources may fit into one or more of the traditional asset functions of generation, transmission, and distribution. Enabling electric storage resources to provide multiple services (including both cost-based and market-based services) ensures that the full capabilities of these resources can be realized, thereby maximizing their efficiency and value for the system and to consumers.*⁴²

While Order No. 841 does not preclude MISO from developing proposals outside of the “participation model,” like MISO has done here with the SATOA Proposal, such proposals must remove, not add, barriers to entry for electric storage resources. The Commission has explained that barriers:

adversely affect competition in the RTO/ISO markets by limiting the participation of resources that are technically capable of providing services in those markets. Moreover, these barriers reduce competition and market efficiency by inhibiting developers’ incentives to design their electric storage resources to provide all capacity, energy, and ancillary services that these resources could otherwise provide. We find that better integration of electric storage resources into the RTO/ISO markets is necessary to enhance competition and, in turn, help to ensure that these markets produce just and reasonable rates. Accordingly, as discussed further below, *we require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariffs to remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in the RTO/ISO markets.*⁴³

⁴² ESR Cost-Based Recovery Policy Statement at P 2.

⁴³ *Id.* at P 20 (emphasis added).

While the Commission has accepted proposals from *individual project sponsors* to participate as only a transmission asset or only a generation asset,⁴⁴ it is an entirely different and discriminatory proposition for an RTO/ISO to propose a model that adds, rather than removes, barriers to participation by electric storage assets.

The SATOA Proposal adds, instead of removing, barriers to the participation of electric storage resources because it prevents storage resources from utilizing their full technical capabilities.⁴⁵ As explained in Section IV.A above, the SATOA Proposal creates discriminatory barriers to participation by Non-TO Projects. For example, a proposed Non-TO Project and proposed TO Project that are identical in all respects will be treated very differently under the SATOA Proposal. While the TO Project will not have to complete the lengthy GIP before it can be included in MTEP, the Non-TO Project will have to complete the lengthy GIP and may be saddled with additional costly upgrades in the process, regardless of whether the project is a “generation” project.⁴⁶ If that Non-TO Project could address a needed local transmission reliability function that it is well suited for as a NTA, it could make its investment economic and provide valuable reliability services to the grid. Because the SATOA Proposal allows the identical TO Project to bypass GIP, the Non-TO Project cannot be fairly evaluated against the TO Project in a timely manner. If the Non-TO Project cannot secure the additional revenue needed to make its investment economic by timely being considered as an alternative, it will not proceed to

⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Western Grid Dev., LLC*, 130 FERC ¶ 61,029 (2010) (“*Western Grid*”).

⁴⁵ See Module A Definition of SATOA (“An Electric Facility connected to or to be connected to the Transmission System and approved for inclusion in Appendix A of the MTEP, as a transmission facility that is part of the Transmission System, that is capable of receiving Energy from the Transmission System and storing Energy for injection to the Transmission System, and is operated only to support the Transmission System. The SATOA shall not participate in the Transmission Provider’s markets except to the extent necessary to receive Energy from the Transmission System and to inject Energy into the Transmission System to provide the services for which the SATOA was included in the MTEP”).

⁴⁶ The SATOA Proposal singles out TO Projects for special treatment but leaves all other Non-TO Projects, whether performing generation functions or not, in the GIP. This is unduly discriminatory.

construction. Thus, the SATOA Proposal creates barriers to Non-TO participation contrary to the policy FERC embraced in Order No. 841.

MISO's vague assertion that it will "review . . . how future modifications to the planning process and market operations can facilitate storage participation in MISO markets and as transmission assets"⁴⁷ does not resolve the barriers created by the immediate discriminatory impacts caused by MISO rushing to file the SATOA Proposal before such "future modifications" are identified. In fact, MISO's assertion highlights the discriminatory effect of the SATOA Proposal: if the SATOA Proposal is approved, TOs will have the ability to circumvent the GIP, giving them an unfair and discriminatory head start that may prove insurmountable for Non-TOs to recover from if and when MISO ever implements its "future modifications." MISO's SATOA Proposal would provide TOs the means to address reliability and market efficiency needs on the transmission grid through the less onerous, quicker and less costly MTEP. In short, TO Projects will be first in time on the grid, perhaps years ahead of Non-TO Projects that are contemplated at the exact same time. TO Projects will supplant Non-TO Projects. For example, if MTEP shows there is a 2 MW need, the TO Project may actually have 10 MW of capability *and it will already be installed on the grid*. SATOA will have a clear market advantage to compete once MISO gets around to implementing its "future modifications." Even if MISO might study the additional 8 MW (in this example) under the GIP, the 2 MW is already there and available to compete. This is the exact situation the Commission sought to remedy when it issued Order No. 888 and then Order No. 890: prevent transmission providers from exerting undue discrimination in the use of transmission to prefer their own generation resources.⁴⁸ The Commission rectified this by

⁴⁷ SATOA Proposal at 24.

⁴⁸ *Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service*, 18 CFR Parts 35 and 37 (2007) ("Because many traditional vertically integrated utilities still did not provide open access to third parties and favored their own generation if and when they provided transmission access to third parties").

requiring open access and requiring transmission providers to place resources on the grid according to the same process. MISO's SATOA Proposal carves out a TO preference in violation of the Commission's basic open access and comparability policies. Accordingly, the SATOA Proposal should be rejected because its "barriers reduce competition and market efficiency by inhibiting developers' incentives to design their electric storage resources to provide all capacity, energy, and ancillary services that these resources could otherwise provide"⁴⁹ – including generation, distribution, and transmission services.

C. MISO Fails To Address Wholesale Market Impacts

SATOA – even if it operates purely as transmission (and is regulated by some operating guide) – will impact wholesale markets. MISO has not addressed how SATOA will impact:

- prices when energy is injected,
- transmission capacity and congestion when energy is injected,
- injection and transmission capacity that Generation has paid for via network upgrades, *i.e.*, usurp capacity,
- other Resources' opportunities to meet energy and ancillary service needs, and
- the GIP (how injection/withdrawals be modeled in Definitive Planning Phase (DPP) studies).

MISO has failed to address all of these wholesale market impacts. MISO dances around the issue by contending it will address the impact to markets in Phase II when it considers how SATOA will participate in energy and ancillary services markets just like all other storage.⁵⁰ Joint MISO Stakeholder Sector Participants respectfully submit that this is not a just and reasonable answer. It is unjust and unreasonable on multiple fronts to push this off to another day. The impacts need to be known before any damage is inflicted or at least so all stakeholders understand the impacts.

⁴⁹ Order No 841 at P 20.

⁵⁰ SATOA Proposal Cover Letter at 9.

MISO's claim that the costs of SATOA charging and energy injection will be captured in transmission rates does not address these market impact issues. Collecting costs in transmission rates says nothing about impacts to wholesale markets. MISO's SATOA Proposal is patently deficient. The Commission routinely rejects patently deficient FPA section 205 filings. It should do the same here.

D. MISO Fails To Explain How Generation In The GIP Will Be Held Harmless

The issue of impact on participants in the GIP queue was raised extensively in the stakeholder process. MISO addresses this issue in its filing, stating: "stakeholder concerns about SATOA impacts to future interconnecting generators were addressed by including provisions to test these impacts and provide for mitigations within the MTEP study process before selecting the SATOA as the preferred solution."⁵¹ Joint MISO Stakeholder Sector Participants respectfully submit this response is an impossibly vague and insufficient answer and is fraught with more questions than it purports to answer.

First, how will MISO "test these impacts" on the DPP process? No details are provided. Again, we must go back to basics: MTEP studies and DPP studies are different; MTEP studies are not intended to be "injection" studies and therefore do not contain the same rigor as studies in the DPP. MISO says it will undertake a system impact study "in a manner comparable" to how it studies all inverter-based facilities.⁵² Again, the details are missing which includes a comparison to how MISO studies projects in MTEP. It is not sufficient to address these details at a later date

⁵¹ SATOA Proposal Cover Letter at 13.

⁵² SATOA Proposal Cover Letter at 18.

in Business Practice Manuals because these issues significantly affect the rates, terms and conditions of service under MISO's OATT.⁵³

Second, what does “provide for mitigations within the MTEP study process” mean and what will it look like? Moreover, how are mitigations in the MTEP process relevant to the impact on the DPP and how will MISO performs DPP studies? MISO says: “If the assessment demonstrates that operation of the SATOA would cause the need for additional system mitigation, such cost will be included in the evaluation of the SATOA against other potential solutions.”⁵⁴ This provides little information to demonstrate that SATOA will not impact Generation in the GIP. The details are once again entirely missing.

Third, at first, MISO proposed during stakeholder discussions that SATOA would only address transmission reliability needs and in that case it might only dispatch SATOA under N-2 conditions. Now, MISO says that SATOA might be a MEP as well.⁵⁵ As a MEP, will SATOA be dispatched at N-0 and N-1 conditions? MISO has not provided any details about the N-0, N-1 and N-2 conditions under which SATOA will be dispatched. Further, MISO has not explained how it will model the dispatch of SATOA in DPP study models. How the dispatch is modeled will have a direct result on whether proposed generation might be assessed network upgrade costs. All of this detail is missing.

⁵³ See, e.g., *California Independent System Operator Corp.*, 122 FERC ¶ 61,271 at P 16 (2008) (citing *City of Cleveland v. FERC*, 773 F.2d 1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that utilities must file “only those practices that affect rates and service significantly, that are reasonably susceptible of specification, and that are not so generally understood in any contractual arrangement as to render recitation superfluous”); *Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. v. FERC*, 813 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the Commission properly excused utilities from filing policies or practices that dealt with only matters of “practical insignificance” to serving customers); *Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.*, 98 FERC ¶61,137 at P 61,401 (stating “It appears that the proposed Operating protocols could significantly affect certain rates and service and as such are required to be filed pursuant to Section 205.”), *clarification granted*, 100 FERC ¶ 61,262 (2002)).

⁵⁴ SATOA Proposal Cover Letter at 21.

⁵⁵ As explained *infra* n 23, as a practical reality, electric storage projects are much more likely to qualify as baseline reliability projects in MTEP than MVP or MEP.

MISO says it will develop Operating Guides for SATOAs. But this provides no assurance and provides no information about the impact on the GIP process (as well as impact on other facets of the MISO wholesale market). MISO has not provided any information about what will be in the Operating Guides. These Operating Guides will directly impact the rates, terms and conditions of in FERC-jurisdictional markets. Additionally, there are no penalties for operating outside of bounds set by the Operating Guide.⁵⁶ The SATOA can contribute to congestion or compete with other generation assets in ways it was not intended to, with absolutely no consequence.

Finally, members of Joint MISO Stakeholder Sector Participants are concerned that SATOA could result in the identification of networks upgrades in DPP studies for proposed generating projects and could even shift network upgrade costs that should be assigned to SATOA (but are not because they are studied under the MTEP) to generation and storage projects in the GIP. MISO has provided no detail to ensure this will not happen. MISO's SATOA Proposal is therefore patently deficient and should be rejected.

E. In Addition To Ignoring Commission Precedent And Policy, MISO Ignored A Stakeholder Vote In Which A Majority of The Planning Advisory Committee Voted For Equivalent Treatment For Interconnection Studies Between TOs And Non-TOs.

MISO's support of discriminatory and preferential interconnection treatment for TOs raises serious issues regarding MISO's obligation to plan the transmission system collaboratively with all market participants, *i.e.*, collaborating with transmission owners and users. "The process for carrying out the planning of MISO *shall be collaborative* with Owners, Users, the OMS

⁵⁶ MISO noted in a September 25, 2019 presentation to the Planning Advisory Committee ([https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190925%20PAC%20Item%2003a%20Storage%20as%20a%20Transmission-Only%20Asset%20\(SATOA\)\(Issue%20PAC004\)384236.pdf](https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190925%20PAC%20Item%2003a%20Storage%20as%20a%20Transmission-Only%20Asset%20(SATOA)(Issue%20PAC004)384236.pdf)) that if the SATOA were to operate outside of limits established in the operating guide "the SATOA will not be eligible to make market offers or participate in the markets in any manner". However, MISO's SATOA proposal does not include the ability for SATOAs make market offers or participate in the Market. Therefore, no consequences would result.

Committee, and other interested parties.”⁵⁷ The Commission has further explained that “[t]his multi-party *collaborative process* is designed to ensure the development of the most efficient and cost-effective Midwest ISO Plan that will meet reliability needs and expand trading opportunities, better integrate the grid, and alleviate congestion, *while giving consideration to the inputs from all stakeholders.*”⁵⁸

MISO failed to give the required collaboration and consideration when it rejected, without credible reason, a PAC recommendation to address discrimination against non-TOs proposing energy storage projects. The PAC recommendation stated:

MISO stakeholders / the PAC recommend that MISO include provisions in its proposed 2019 SATOA filing to allow Non-Transmission Alternative storage projects to bypass the Generation Interconnection Process and connect to the MISO transmission system via Storage Interconnection Agreements (SIAs) with MISO and the TO where these projects would, like a SATOA project, satisfy the following operational and planning criteria: (i) resolve a transmission-reliability issue identified in the MTEP process; (ii) satisfy the same performance criteria as would be required for a SATOA project in the MTEP analysis; and (iii) be operated strictly at the direction of MISO’s transmission-reliability function to address such issues.⁵⁹

In rejecting the PAC recommendation, which passed 5.5 in favor to 2.5 against (68.75% in favor),⁶⁰ all MISO stated was that it had a “fundamental disagreement with the position that an asset that is used exclusively to address a transmission issue and that is connected to the

⁵⁷ MISO TOA, Appendix B, Section II (emphasis added); *see also* See MISO TOA, Appendix B, Section VI (“The Planning Staff, *working in collaboration* with representatives of the Owners, the OMS Committee, and the Planning Advisory Committee, shall develop the MISO Plan, consistent with Good Utility Practice and taking into consideration long-range planning horizons, as appropriate.”) (emphasis added).

⁵⁸ MISO TOA, Appendix B, Section VI.

⁵⁹ *See* <https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20191016%20PAC%20Item%20XX%20DTE%20SATOA%20Alternative387746.pdf>.

⁶⁰ *Id.*

transmission system is a non-transmission asset – it is a transmission asset.”⁶¹ MISO’s conclusion that “it is a transmission asset” does not consider all stakeholders because it ignores the full functionality and value of energy storage projects as discussed above, including the full potential of storage to resolve transmission issues even while serving distribution, generation, or other purposes as well.⁶² In addition, MISO’s logic ignores MISO’s own professed plan to allow energy storage projects to provide other services to wholesale markets in the future.⁶³

MISO’s rejection of the PAC recommendation and support of the preferential treatment for TOs also raises serious issues regarding MISO’s independence. For an RTO, like MISO, to credibly administer wholesale markets in an unbiased and non-discriminatory manner, it “must have a decision-making process that is independent of control by any market participant or class of participants.”⁶⁴ RTOs were formed to ensure that competition was not harmed by the discriminatory actions of vertically integrated utilities. Notably, in Order 2000, the Commission stated:

traditional management of the transmission grid by vertically integrated electric utilities was inadequate to support the efficient and reliable operation that is needed for the continued development of competitive electricity markets, and that continued discrimination in the provision of transmission services by vertically integrated utilities may also be impeding fully competitive electricity markets. These problems may be depriving the Nation of the benefits of lower prices and enhanced reliability.⁶⁵

⁶¹ “Electric Storage as a Transmission-Only Asset (SATO A) Phase I Policy Proposal (PAC 004)” presentation to PAC dated May 13, 2019, available at [https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190515%20PAC%20Item%2005%20SATO A%20\(PAC004\)344407.pdf](https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20190515%20PAC%20Item%2005%20SATO A%20(PAC004)344407.pdf).

⁶² *See infra* § IV.B.

⁶³ SATOA Proposal at fn. 6; *see also* SATOA Proposal Cover Letter at 5 (“MISO and its stakeholders will begin the process of developing rules to enable storage as both transmission and to provide market services in early 2020.”)

⁶⁴ Order No. 2000 at pp.152-153.

⁶⁵ Order No. 2000 at p.2.

MISO’s decision to ignore the PAC’s recommendation, which was approved with a majority vote, in the favor of the SATOA Proposal, which contradicts Commission policy and clearly favors TOs, demonstrates MISO’s lack of independence from the will of its TO members. MISO’s lack of independence results in unduly preferential treatment for TOs under MISO’s SATOA Proposal, and requires the Commission to reject MISO’s SATOA Proposal.

F. If the SATOA Proposal Is Not Rejected, FERC Should Condition Acceptance On Revisions To Ensure Full Utilization Of The Technical Capabilities Of All Electric Storage Resources On A Non-Discriminatory And Non-Preferential Basis.

If the SATOA Proposal is not rejected, the Commission should exercise its authority to condition its acceptance on MISO revising the SATOA Proposal to address the potential issues set forth in the following table.⁶⁶

Issue	Discussion
Discrimination and Preference	<p>To be non-discriminatory and non-preferential, the SATOA Proposal should be revised to include additional tariff revisions to allow NTA electric storage projects to be developed in the same manner as SATOA projects.</p> <p>Specifically, for Non-TO Projects to compete on a level playing field, they should be permitted to interconnect to the MISO transmission system, or otherwise be considered as NTA solutions to transmission issues, without obtaining a signed GIA where such projects would, like a SATOA project, satisfy the following operational and planning</p>

⁶⁶ While the DC Circuit Court of Appeals narrowed the Commission’s ability to condition its acceptance of public utilities’ FPA Section 205 filings, *NRG v. FERC*, 862 F.3d 108 (DC Cir 2017) (*NRG*), the changes requested here are permissible because they do not result in “an entirely new rate scheme” or “completely different strategy.” The MISO SATOA Proposal Cover Letter identified MISO’s purpose with the SATOA as “a fundamental first step forward for the use of storage resources to maximize the reliability and efficiency of the electric system”. The proposed conditions here further that same strategy of promoting “the use of storage resources to maximize the reliability and efficiency of the electric system.” *NRG* allows the FERC to propose conditions to the public utility to accept in lieu of rejection of the tariff or rate schedule submission.

Issue	Discussion
	<p>criteria: (i) resolve a transmission-reliability issue identified in the MTEP process; (ii) satisfy the same performance criteria as would be required for a SATOA project in the MTEP analysis; and (iii) be operated strictly at the direction of MISO's transmission-reliability function to address such issues.</p> <p>Alternatively, MISO could create a streamlined Storage Interconnection Process for all electric storage resources that avoids the delays inherent in the current GIP. MISO's Tariff and BPM includes an out-of-DPP-cycle streamlined process for Generator Replacement that still undertakes necessary study rigor. A similar process could be added for storage.</p> <p>The SATOA Proposal should be revised so that it does not force one class of electric storage resource to pay more, or recover less, for charging energy based solely in which planning process the project is developed in.</p>
Cross Subsidization	<p>The SATOA Proposal should be revised to address potential cross subsidization that would occur if an electric storage resource developed to address reliability concerns is called on under emergency conditions to address a transmission reliability issue that extends beyond the transmission pricing zone it operates in. This will ensure that rate paid by transmission customers in one zone do not subsidize another zone.</p>
Dynamic Instability	<p>By allowing inverter-based TO Projects through MTEP, while Non-TO Projects that are inverter-based incur different GIP study criteria, there is a very real potential for increased risk of mis-diagnosed controller interaction and/or undiagnosed controller issues. This increases the risk of dynamic instability on the grid. The SATOA Proposal should be revised to create rule sets that assure TO Projects do not circumvent the same dynamic study rigor that is required in the GIP.</p>

Issue	Discussion
Market Price Distortion	The SATOA Proposal should implement tariff provisions that will assure market pricing distortion does not occur as a result of SATOA Projects injecting and absorbing energy at different times.
Operating Guides	If MISO intends to develop Operating Guides, the details about how SATOA will be dispatched and under what conditions must be known and demonstrated to be just and reasonable. Such Operating guides directly impact the rates, terms and conditions of jurisdictional service.
Impact of the GIP	MISO must provide tariff provisions that explain how it will study SATOA in the MTEP, how that will be reflected in DPP studies and how there will be no cost shifts or other deleterious effect.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Joint MISO Stakeholder Sector Participants respectfully request that the Commission reject the SATOA Proposal and direct MISO to develop a just and reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential proposal to allow both TO Projects and Non-TO Projects to participate in MISO markets via the same process whether that is through the MTEP, the GIP, or some other streamlined process. In the alternative, if the SATOA Proposal is

not rejected outright, it should be conditioned in accordance with the foregoing.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jane E. Rueger

Jane E. Rueger
Fredrick Wilson
White & Case LLP
701 Thirteenth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 626-6534
jrueger@whitecase.com
fredrick.wilson@whitecase.com
Counsel for DTE Electric Company

/s/ Cortlandt C. Choate Jr.

Cortlandt C. Choate Jr.
Senior Attorney
Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.
4902 North Biltmore Lane
Madison WI, 53718
(608) 458-6217
CortlandtChoate@alliantenergy.com
For Alliant Energy Corporate Services, Inc.

/s/ Kate O'Connell

Kate O'Connell
Supervisor, Energy Regulation & Planning
Minnesota Department of Commerce
85 7th Place East, Suite 280
St. Paul, MN 55101-2198
(651) 539-1815
kate.oconnell@state.mn.us
For Minnesota Department of Commerce

/s/ John R Liskey

John R Liskey
Counsel
Citizens Against Rate Excess
921 N. Washington Ave
Lansing, MI 48906
(517) 913-5105
john@liskeypllc.com
For Citizens Against Rate Excess

/s/ Ann Coultas

Ann Coultas
Manager, Regulatory Affairs
Invenergy, LLC
One South Wacker Drive, Suite 1800
Chicago, IL 60606
(317) 519-3792
acoultas@invenergyllc.com
For Invenergy Storage Development LLC

/s/ Emerson J. Hilton

Emerson J. Hilton
Corporate Counsel
Consumers Energy Company
One Energy Plaza
Jackson, Michigan 49201
(517) 788-1241
emerson.hilton@cmsenergy.com
For Consumers Energy Company

/s/ Daniel R. Simon

Daniel R. Simon
Clark Hill PLC
1001 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Suite 1300 South
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 572-8669
dsimon@clarkhill.com
*Counsel for EDF Renewables Development,
Inc.*

/s/ Rhonda Peters

Rhonda Peters
Principal
InterTran Energy Consulting
1610 S Valentine Way
Lakewood, CO 80228
(720) 319-1860
intertranec@gmail.com
For Clean Grid Alliance

/s/ Michael Moody

Michael Moody
Assistant Attorney General
Michigan Department of Attorney General
P.O. Box 30212
Lansing, MI 48909
(517) 335-7627
moodym2@michigan.gov
For Michigan Department of Attorney General

/s/ Paul Varnado

Paul Varnado
Assistant General Counsel
RWE Renewables Americas, LLC0
353 N. Clark Street, 30th Floor
Chicago, IL 60654
(312) 358-9873
paul.varnado@rwe.com
For RWE Renewables Americas, LLC

/s/ Tom Content

Tom Content
Executive Director
Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin
6401 Odana Rd., Suite 24
Madison, WI 53719
(608) 251-3322
content@cubwi.org
For Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin

/s/ Charlotte Jameson

Charlotte Jameson
Program Director Legislative Affairs,
Energy, and Drinking Water Policy
Michigan Environmental Council
602 W. Ionia St.
Lansing, MI 48933
(517) 487-9539
charlotte@environmentalcouncil.org
For Michigan Environmental Council

/s/ Amy Bandyk

Amy Bandyk
Executive Director
Citizens Utility Board of Michigan
921 N. Washington Ave
Lansing, MI 48906
(248) 385-3167
amy.bandyk@cubofmichigan.org
For Citizens Utility Board of Michigan

/s/ Gabe Tabak

Gabe Tabak
Counsel
American Wind Energy Association
1501 M St. NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 383-2500
gtabak@awea.org
For American Wind Energy Association

/s/ Steven Shparber

Steven Shparber
Counsel
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough
101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 689-2994
steven.shparber@nelsonmullins.com
*Counsel for the American Wind Energy
Association and the Solar Council*

/s/ Derek Sunderman

Derek Sunderman
Vice President Transmission
Savion, LLC
422 Admiral Boulevard
Kansas City, MO. 64106
(785) 766-7613
dsunderman@savionenergy.com
For Savion, LLC

/s/ Elizabeth Toba Pearlman

Elizabeth Toba Pearlman
Renewable Energy Advocate/Senior Attorney
Natural Resources Defense Council
20 North Wacker Dr., Suite 1600
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 995-5907
TPEARLMAN@NRDC.ORG
*Counsel for Natural Resources Defense
Council*

/s/ Malcolm Woolf

Malcolm Woolf
President and CEO
National Hydropower Association
601 New Jersey Ave NW
Washington, D.C. 20001
202-682-1700
MWOolf@hydro.org
For National Hydropower Association

/s/ John N. Moore

John N. Moore
Senior Attorney and Director
Sustainable FERC Project
20 North Wacker Street, Suite 1600
Chicago, IL 60201
(312) 651-7927
Moore.fercproject@gmail.com
Counsel for Sustainable FERC Project

/s/ Michael R. Engleman

Michael R. Engleman
Engleman Fallon, PLLC
1717 K Street, NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 464-1332
E-mail: mengleman@efenergyllaw.com
*Counsel for LSP Transmission Holdings II,
LLC*

Dated January 21, 2020

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated on the official service lists compiled by the Secretary in these proceedings.

Dated at Washington, D.C., this 21st day of January 2020.

/s/Fredrick Wilson

Fredrick Wilson

White & Case LLP

701 Thirteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 626-3670

fredrick.wilson@whitecase.com

Document Content(s)

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